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ABSTRACT 
 
Although hydrate formation phenomenon has been identified for many years, this 
is still one of the most challenging problems in oil & gas industry as they are associated 
with flow assurance problems and safety issues. Although, many studies have focused on 
developing thermodynamic and kinetic models to understand and predict hydrate 
formation, this phenomenon is not fully understood and there is not a general methodology 
for the quantification of the risk that considers the uncertainty associated with key input 
parameters. Therefore, there is a need for developing risk assessment methodologies, 
which considers, not only the models for predicting hydrates, but also the organizational 
factors associated with the hydrate management system. 
In this work, a comprehensive framework was developed for estimating the risk of 
hydrate formation in a subsea production operation taking into consideration the 
effectiveness of the entire hydrate management system. The proposed framework was 
divided in three areas: 1) definition of causal and consequence models; 2) application of 
Bayesian Networks; and 3) sensitivity analysis of the thermodynamic or kinetic models. 
In order to probe the concept and illustrate the application of the proposed 
framework, a hypothetical case study was created based on literature data and inputs 
provided by flow assurance experts from academia and industry. Causal and consequence 
models were developed, including a visual representation of the preventive and mitigative 
measures. The hydrate equilibrium curves were generated using PVTsim Nova software, 
and the uncertainty analysis was done with Latin Hypercube Method and statistical 
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calculations. the Bayesian Networks method was used to understand the complexities 
associated with the Hydrate Management System. This model solved with AgenaRisk 
software using discrete and continuous distributions. 
The results of this work include the visual representation of the probabilistic 
relationship between certain components and variables of a typical hydrate management 
system, which can affect the reliability of the control and preventive measures for hydrate 
control. The probability values calculated in this case study were in agreement with 
likelihood values typically used in a  risk matrix, which probes that the proposed approach 
is a good starting point for future improvements to the proposed framework. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Gas molecules (methane, ethane, propane and others) can become trapped inside a 
crystal water structure, (comprised of water cages connected in a three-dimensional 
lattice) resulting in solid-ice like formations known as “hydrates.” The required conditions 
for hydrates to form are the presence of water (small percentage), an oil/gas composition 
(light gas molecules), a high pressure, and a low temperature.  Hydrate crystals can grow 
by an agglomeration process that can result in a plug (Figure 1) reprinted with permission 
from (Joshi et al., 2013), becoming a serious hazard at normal conditions in common 
subsea operations. There are other conditions that can influence hydrate formation and 
growth, including liquid loading, mixture velocity, salt content, presence of surfactants, 
water droplet diameter (water surface area), pipeline length, location, water depth, flow 
line geometry (i.e., presence of low spots) and inhibitor concentration (Chaudhari, 2016). 
Figure 1. Schematic of hydrate formation and plugging mechanism in low water cut systems, "water 
emulsified oil.” Reprinted with permission from (Joshi et al., 2013). 
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Hydrate formation is a challenging and a potentially dangerous problem as there 
is no complete understanding of hydrate formation phenomena. Hydrates can cause flow 
assurance problems (Gudmundsson, 2002), including blockages in wells, risers, flow-
lines, and manifolds, which could result in kicks, ruptures, leakages or even blowouts 
(Sloan, Koh, & Sum, 2010); thereby, causing significant process safety issues and severe 
environmental impacts. 
Although hydrates have been identified as a potential hazard in offshore drilling 
and production operations, the number of documented incidents is small. Unfortunately, 
it has been difficult to find conclusive evidence to link hydrate formation as a root cause 
to those incidents, because the evidence disappears easily. However, some incidents in 
which hydrate formation was suspected to be a contributing factor are shown in Table 1.     
Table 1. List of Incidents Due to Problems Related to Hydrate Formation 
Name of 
incident or 
company 
Year Problems related to hydrate Formation Consequences 
 
 
 
Piper Alpha 
(Johnsen, 1990) 
 
 
 
 
1998 
An incident investigation concluded that 
hydrate slurry arriving at the condensate 
injection pump could have blocked the 
pump discharge valve and the downstream 
process lines. It is possible that this 
blockage was the cause for tripping the 
injection pump, which started the chain of 
events that led to the Piper Alpha disaster. 
 
 
Process Safety and 
Environmental 
Energy 
Company in 
Alberta (Sloan 
Jr & Koh, 
2007) 
1991 
A supervisor died due to the impact of a 
hydrate projectile arising during a wrong 
implementation of a depressurization 
process. 
Process Safety 
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Table 1 Continued 
Name of 
incident or 
company 
Year Problems related to hydrate Formation Consequences 
Macondo Well 
Explosion and 
Fire (Giavarini 
& Hester, 
2011) 
2010 
 
BP faced hydrate formation issues during 
the utilization of the cofferdam, which was 
part of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
Response. 
Process safety, 
environmental, 
asset damage, 
production losses, 
and reputational 
impact 
 
Even with such incidents related to hydrate formation, there is a lack of 
fundamental understanding of the phenomena, especially it has been difficult to estimate 
incident probability and understand the formation conditions. In addition, the probability 
of blockage, associated consequences, and systematic risks are not properly understood. 
Therefore, further research is required to find a solution to this problem. This is 
particularly important considering that the oil and gas industry is moving towards deep-
water environments (higher pressures & lower temperatures) where hydrates can form and 
potentially lead to environmental or process safety incidents. The focus of these research 
should be aimed to understand the hydrate formation phenomena and be able to estimate 
the associated risk of the Hydrate Management System (HMS). 
Over the past few years, considerable research efforts have focused on developing 
thermodynamic and kinetic models to understand hydrate formation. One of the challenges 
faced in this journey is that the hydrate formation phenomenon involves multiphase flow 
and multi-component environments, which makes it difficult to develop accurate 
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prediction models. Although the hydrate formation mechanism is not completely 
understood, and therefore it is difficult to accurately predict their formation, the industry 
have been using different techniques to prevent hydrate formation including: use of 
Thermodynamic Hydrate Inhibitors (THI) (Brustad, Løken, & Waalmann; Frostman, 
Thieu, Crosby, & Downs, 2003); Low Dosage Hydrate Inhibitors (LDHI) (Chua, Kelland, 
Hirano, & Yamamoto, 2012; Daraboina, Malmos, & von Solms, 2013; Lou et al., 2012; 
Webber & Nagappayya, 2016), which are divided into Kinetic Hydrate Inhibitors (KHI) 
and Anti-Agglomerates (AAs); Direct Electrical Heating (DEH) (Bollavaram and Sloan 
Jr 2003); Electrical Trace Heating (ETH) (Tzotzi et al., 2014); and Depressurization 
methods (Bollavaram & Sloan Jr, 2003; Sloan et al., 2010). The selection of a particular 
preventive, and mitigation strategy depends on the operational conditions, the inherent 
risk associated with the operations, environmental regulations, and economics.       
The use of inhibitors (J. Kim, Noh, Chang, & Chang, 2016) is the most common 
technique to control hydrate formation.  The so called THI, like methanol (MeOH) or 
mono-ethylene glycol (MEG), shift the hydrate equilibrium towards higher pressures and 
lower temperatures. Kinetic hydrate inhibitors (KHI) delay hydrate nucleation and crystal 
growth. Anti-agglomerates (AAs) do not prevent the formation of hydrates, but they 
prevent hydrate particles from agglomerating and forming a plug. Although these types of 
inhibitors have demonstrated to be effective, the oil & gas industry is conducting 
exploration activities in deeper and colder waters, which requires an incremental increase 
in inhibitor injection rates; therefore, increasing the overall production costs (J. Kim, Noh, 
Ryu, Seo, & Chang, 2016). Although, low dosage hydrate inhibitors could overcome part 
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of this problem, it is necessary to develop a special monitoring system to monitor the 
operations effectively (Clark & Aanderson, 2007; Patel, 2015; Tian, Bailey, Fontenot, & 
Nicholson, 2011). According to the literature, an insufficient supply of AAs were 
responsible for hydrate blockage formation in the Longhorn gas-condensate field 
operation (Patel, Dibello, Fontenot, Guillory, & Hesketh-Prichard, 2011). Also, during the 
depressurization process as part of the remediation method, the main concern is the 
hydrate’s velocity when it breaks free to dissociate the plug, especially for one-sided 
depressurization (Xiao, Shoup, Hatton, & Kruka, 1998). As depicted by these cases, all 
the existing techniques have notorious and uncontrollable drawbacks, which somehow 
affect the solution to stop and/or control hydrate formation as part of flow assurance issues.   
Earlier approaches to hydrate control have focused on the avoidance of hydrate 
formation by using preventive methods like THI’s. Nowadays, hydrate prevention is 
moving towards a risk-based approach (Sloan, 2005). This new approach allows for a 
controlled hydrate formation inside pipelines to prevent blockage (J. Kim, Noh, Chang, et 
al., 2016), and recommends implementing AAs inhibitors that must be closely monitored 
(Patel, 2015). Still, an estimation of the risk associated with this approach is in question, 
as uncertainties coming from human interface, equipment reliability and software used to 
predict hydrate formation are not well defined.  
Different types of software packages, such as CSMGem (Ballard & Sloan Jr, 
2004), DBR Hydrate (Schlumberger, 2017), Multiflash (KBC, 2016), PVTSim (Calsep, 
2015), HydraFlash (Mazloum, Chapoy, Yang, & Tohidi, 2011), and OLGA (Boxall, 
Davies, Koh, & Sloan, 2009), include models to obtain thermodynamic and kinetics 
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information, which is useful for estimating hydrate formation risk. However, none of them 
seems to include a probabilistic relationship that takes into consideration all the 
operational variables and the conditions that contribute to hydrate formation. Knowing 
this relationship information is fundamental to understand the behavior of the system 
under different operational scenarios (drilling, normal operations, shutdown, and start up) 
and the complex procedures that require human intervention.  
Although the Bayesian Networks method has not been fully applied to offshore 
quantitative risk assessments, Bayesian Networks (BN) can be used to represent the 
probabilistic relationships among operational variables and the conditions that contribute 
to hydrate formation, as this method  is effective in representing probabilistic relationship 
among a large number of random variables (Bhandari, Abbassi, Garaniya, & Khan, 2015). 
Therefore, this method provides a promising opportunity to improve the analysis of 
hydrate formation by integrating updated mechanisms, as mentioned by Herath (Herath, 
Khan, Rathnayaka, & Rahman, 2015). After an extensive literature review into the 
application of BNs to analyze the existing hydrate formation issue in subsea operations, 
this was found to be extremely limited. This presents a unique opportunity to apply the 
Bayesian probabilistic models to improve prediction and evaluation of equipment failure 
due to or related to hydrate formation and assess the actual risk. It is expected that by 
employing this approach it will be possible to expand the operational windows, without 
compromising safety or costs, and assist in proactive measures against hydrate formation 
leading to safer, continuous, and economical production.  
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1.2 Problem Statement and Objectives  
Although there are several studies aimed at understanding the hydrate formation 
mechanisms, there is not a complete understanding of this phenomenon yet. Consequently, 
there is no ultimate solution for estimating the actual risk posed by hydrates to subsea 
production operations. Therefore, research is required to develop new approaches. In 
recent years, the industry has moved towards the use of risk-based approaches for 
assessing hydrate formation. However, the development of a true more comprehensive 
approach is required for assessing the hydrate formation problem. The proposed work is a 
step in that direction.  
The aim of this research is to review existing deterministic approaches for hydrate 
formation prediction and develop a framework for estimating the risk using probabilistic 
methods. Specific objectives of the present work are summarized as:  
 Analyze common subsea production systems and identify the different scenarios 
in which hydrate formations could occur and potentially impact process safety and 
environmental concerns. 
 Review and evaluate deterministic and probabilistic methods for the prediction of 
hydrate formation and identify opportunities for optimization of these methods 
(i.e., apply Bayesian probability theory). 
 The aim of this research is to propose a framework for quantifying the risk of 
hydrate formation and recommend strategies for managing this risk in deepwater 
subsea operations. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
First, an extensive literature review was conducted to understand the process safety 
problems that could be caused by hydrate formation in deepwater production operations. 
The second part of the literature review was focused on answering four main questions: 
1) What has academia and the industry been doing to prevent and/or mitigate those 
problems? 2) How has the hydrate management system been applied in different 
companies? 3) Does the hydrate management system rely on different components, for 
instance, “human interface or equipment reliability?” 4) What are the general knowledge 
gaps in academia and industry? 
Therefore, after having identified different knowledge gaps, including the limited 
availability of probabilistic approaches of hydrate formation, Section 3 describes the 
comprehensive framework proposed for modeling the operational risk of hydrate 
management systems using Bayesian Networks, which includes a probabilistic analysis. 
Section 4 shows the applicability of the proposed framework by developing a 
hypothetical case study of a natural gas flow line. This exercise was developed to probe 
the concept with limited information and some experts’ inputs, but with the purpose of 
looking for opportunities to improve the proposed framework.  
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the conclusions and recommendations for future 
work on this topic and includes some more ideas to improve the framework. Figure 2 
shows a summary of the thesis structure.  
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Figure 2. Summary of the thesis structure. 
 
  
10 
2 STATUS OF HYDRATE FORMATION RESEARCH 
Increasing energy demand in the last decades has led to a need for more frequent 
exploration and development of deep and ultra-deep water production to satisfy oil and 
gas demand. Thereby the deep and ultra-deep production have been increasing the 
system's complexity and operational expenditures due to the harsh environments (high 
pressures, low temperatures, and high salinity), leading to many challenges, for instance: 
equipment integrity, operation complexity (difficulty of performing real-time monitoring), 
flow assurance issues (gas hydrates and wax), sinking wellheads, loss of circulation, and 
drilling geohazards (overpressured sands, irregular topography, sea floor erosion, gas 
hydrates) (Rocha, Junqueira, & Roque, 2003) among others. 
Recently, offshore oil reservoirs produced 30% of the total global oil production. 
Reaching about 9.3 million barrels per day in 2015, offshore oil and gas production occurs 
at different depths, roughly as follows: deepwater (410 to 4922 ft) and ultra-deepwater 
(more than 5,000 ft) (Manning, 2016).  These systems can easily reach hydrostatic 
pressures that exceed 5,000 psi and temperatures lower than 32 oF. These conditions may 
not be reached through the wellbore, where the temperatures are particularly high; 
however, when the fluid is transported from the reservoir to the processing facility, it can 
lose temperature to the environment through the length of the flowline. Figure 3 adapted 
from (Usman, Olatunde, Adeosun, & Egwuenu, 2012) shows a general system of the 
subsea production at deepwater and ultra-deepwater levels. 
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Figure 3. Sea bed of a subsea production system. Adapted from (Usman et al., 2012) 
 
Tying marginal field production of small reservoirs to platforms for larger 
reservoirs is a common practice to offset unjustifiable costs.  Nowadays, Floating 
Production Storage and Offloading (FPSOs) are commonly used for this kind of 
production as shown in Figure 3 adapted from (Usman et al., 2012). A number of drilling 
centers composed of different equipment as it is shown in Figure 4 adapted from 
(FMCTechnologies, 2010), which include subsea trees, manifold, Jumpers, Umbilical 
Termination Assembly (UTA), and a Flowline End Termination (FLET). The FLET is the 
equipment that supports the flowlines that are tied back to the FPSO as shown in Figure 3 
adapted from (Usman et al., 2012).  
FPSO 
Drilling center 
Flowlines Control umbilical  
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Figure 4. General arrangement of a drilling center. Adapted from (FMCTechnologies, 2010) 
 
Flowline lengths vary depending on how far the target processing facility is from 
the reservoir or how far the fluid should be transported after it is processed. The flowline 
can reach several miles (Reith & Lasgstrom, 2015). Therefore, due to all these complex 
systems, many challenges need to be addressed. This section will discuss hydrate 
formation issues encountered in the whole process (drilling and production), and study 
them to understand the phenomenon and methods commonly used to prevent and/or 
mitigate.   
2.1 Hydrate Formation in Upstream (Drilling and Production) 
Gas hydrates can form at any point of the production process from the wellbore to 
the topside, as long as the system reaches the necessary conditions, including high 
pressure, low temperature, light gas concentration and water concentration. Depending on 
the system, there may be some points more susceptible to hydrate formation than others. 
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A good comparison of two different systems is the seafloor versus the wellbore; the 
seafloor contains all the subsea equipment that can reach temperatures as low as 40 ̊ F 
while the wellbore annulus can reach temperatures as high as 200 ̊ F (Feng, 2011). Figure 
5 adapted from (Chaudhari, 2016; Galvão, 2016) shows the general production scheme 
from the wellbore to the topside and a case of hydrate formation in a flowline.     
 
Figure 5. a, b) Offshore production system, adapted from (Galvão, 2016), c) hydrate formation at 
campos Basin (Brazil),  in 2001, adapted from (Chaudhari, 2016). 
 
During drilling operations, hydrates can lead to blockages in tubing, affecting 
valves and the operation of the Blowout Preventers (BOP). Hydrates also can block other 
orifices that contain limited to no circulation. In a study conducted by Ward (Ward et al., 
2003), the fluid temperature was measured at the mud line depth to monitor the effects of 
low temperatures. A sensor was deployed inside the bottomhole assembly during drilling 
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operations to obtain real-time data. It was found that low fluid temperatures in conjunction 
with high pressures, as experienced during deepwater drilling, cause gas hydrate formation 
that results in hazardous scenario, such as the plugging of the BOPs or the risers.    
On the other hand, hydrate formation can also start in places with minimal or no 
circulation including Kill line, choke valves or locations close to the BOP (Feng, 2011).  
Due to the environmental conditions, subsea equipment between the wellhead and 
the delivery systems is more vulnerable to hydrate formation. Flowlines used to transport 
the fluid from the reservoir to the processing facilities, and those used to transport the fluid 
after the processing facilities to the final point in the delivery system, are exposed to longer 
heat transfer times, which is ideal for hydrate formation (Wilfred & Appah, 2015). This 
can be a problem either in normal operations or at shut-down and restart scenarios due to 
gas hydrate blockages leading to unexpected operational and safety problems (Sloan et 
al., 2010). Although one of the biggest concerns related to hydrate formation is the cost 
associated with prevention, mitigation, and recovery, there is also a safety concern since 
it can lead to safety and environmental consequences. This event may be considered 
having a very low probability of failure as it has large number of preventive barriers that 
need to fail. However, events involving hydrate formation can still be accompanied with 
very high consequences which ultimately lead to high risk.  
2.2 Safety Aspects of Hydrates in the Oil and Gas Industry   
The main safety aspects to consider during drilling and operations in the oil and 
gas industry is plugging.  
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Plugging (Amodu, 2008; Sloan Jr & Koh, 2007): there are different scenarios where 
environmental and operational issues can lead to hydrate formation in different equipment. 
This equipment might include Blowout Preventers (BOP), where a plugging can build up 
well pressure and interfere with the proper function of the BOP (when the plugging is 
located in BOP's ram cavity). Plugging can also form at the choke and kill-line, making it 
difficult to use these lines in well circulation, and between the drill string and the BOP, 
which can lead to problems when complete closing of the BOP is necessary. Finally, 
plugging can also form in the wellhead and many equipment after it including manifolds, 
risers, pipelines, Jumpers, and flowlines. Hydrates plug-in in any of the aforementioned 
equipment are usually controlled or removed through different strategies depending on the 
scenario. 
2.3 Thermodynamic Models to predict Hydrate Formation    
In the early 1810s, Humphry Davy found evidence that some gases could form 
solid compounds with water, and these were suspected to be hydrates. Later on, John 
Faraday proved the existence of hydrates through experiments. In 1930, Hammerschmidt 
concluded that some of the blockages in the oil and gas industry could be caused by 
hydrate formation (in gas transmission lines) (Sloan Jr & Koh, 2007), especially at 
temperatures above the freezing point. After this discovery, the interest and efforts to 
understand the hydrate phenomena started to increase with each decade as was shown by 
Sloan (Sloan, 2005).     
Based on the research results, three different structures of hydrates were 
determined based on the type and the various sizes of the guest molecules, which allow 
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different cage arrangements, especially because of the number of water molecules 
necessary to capture the guest molecule is different. The hydration number is defined as 
the ratio of water-to-guest molecules. The most common structures of hydrates include 
(Giavarini & Hester, 2011):  
 Structure I (sI): It is the smallest repeating crystal unit, which is a body-centered 
cubic lattice composed of 46 water molecules with 6 large cages and 2 small cages. 
Gases that commonly form sI hydrates include methane, ethane, CO2, and H2S. 
The hydrate number for full occupancy is 5.75 (46/78). See Figure 6 (left) adapted 
from (Giavarini & Hester, 2011). 
 Structure II (sII): The unit cell is a face-centered cubic lattice composed of 136 
water molecules with 8 large cages and 16 small cages. Gas molecules that 
commonly form sII hydrates include propane and I-butane, and those that form 
small sII hydrate structures include hydrogen, helium, and nitrogen. The hydrate 
number for full occupancy and small sII structures is 5.67 (136/24) and for large 
sII structures is 17. See Figure 6 (right) adapted from (Giavarini & Hester, 2011). 
 Structure H (sH): The unit cell has a hexagonal lattice composed of 34 water 
molecules with 3 different types of cages: 3 small cages, 2 medium cages, and 1 
large cage. One of the gas molecules that commonly forms sH hydrates is methyl-
cyclohexane. However, the formation only happens with the help of a second small 
gas molecule (i.e., methane), which is needed to stabilize the small and medium 
cages present in this structure.  
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            Figure 6. Small cage of a hydrate type 1 and 2. Adapted from (Giavarini & Hester, 2011). 
 
Figure 7 reprinted with permission from (Giavarini & Hester, 2011) shows an 
example of a typical phase diagram for pure hydrocarbons that form hydrates. The curve 
defines the points where the hydrates are stable, and it is called the hydrate stability curve. 
The hydrate stability curve is composed of two main regions (Giavarini & Hester, 2011): 
1) the hydrate stability region, which is represented by the left region of the line (generally 
low temperatures and high pressures); and 2) the right region of the line, in which 
theoretically the hydrates cannot be stable. The curve has two quadruple points, Q1 and 
Q2, where four phases coexist. In the case of Q1, the four coexisting phases include Liquid 
water (Lw), Ice (I), Hydrate (H), and Hydrocarbon Vapor (V), while for Q2, the coexisting 
phases are Liquid water (LW), Hydrate (H), Hydrocarbon Vapor (V), and Liquid 
Hydrocarbon (LHC).  
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Figure 7.  A typical P-T diagram for a pure hydrocarbon (larger than methane). Reprinted with 
permission from (Giavarini & Hester, 2011) 
 
The fundamentals of the current thermodynamic models were established by 
formulating hydrate thermodynamic property prediction methods. Different methods have 
been developed since 1951, either by doing experiments, correlations and/or models, for 
instance, those done by Kobayashi and Katz (Kobayashi & Katz, 1953), or studies such as 
those recently completed by Harmens and Sloan (Harmens & Sloan, 1990) and Hou (Huo, 
Hester, Sloan, & Miller, 2003). All these studies were focused on binary (such as 
hydrocarbon-water systems) and ternary systems. The most recognized and useful way to 
generate the phase diagram is by determining the equilibrium of the three phases (Lw-H-
V). These diagrams allow one to define under what conditions of pressure and temperature 
hydrates can form for a given gas and water composition. The two existing methods for 
determining the equilibrium of the three phases are the gas gravity method and the 
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distribution coefficient method (Kvsi) method. One disadvantage of the gas gravity method 
is that it cannot be used to calculate the hydrate composition.  However, in 1959, van der 
Waals and Platteuw developed one of the earliest but most remarkable approaches used in 
the development of the method for determining the equilibrium of the three phases 
currently used, which allows for the calculation of the hydrate composition. This method 
uses statistical thermodynamics to predict equilibrium conditions including intermolecular 
potentials using microscopic properties at a given pressure and temperature. For many 
years, this method has been refined by different scientists, giving a good estimation of the 
hydrate phase equilibrium (Sloan Jr & Koh, 2007).  
Nowadays, there are different commercially available software programs used for 
hydrate formation prediction. These programs use models based on the statistical 
thermodynamic approach with some modifications that increase the accuracy of the 
model. For instance, the basis for the PVTsim (version 13) (Calsep, 2015) is the chemical 
potential and the minimization of Gibbs Free Energy. 
Ballard and Sloan (Sloan Jr & Koh, 2007) developed a study to compare the 
accuracy of the different commercial hydrate programs. They found that between the 
different programs, the average absolute error in the temperature is confined to a range 
between 0.4 to 0.66 kelvin degrees, which is acceptable in the engineering world. 
However, the current changes to the oil and gas composition associated with the new 
reservoirs and the field life, bring new challenges related to the accuracy of the models 
available, which introduces a degree of uncertainty into the calculations when making 
selections, for example the salt content composition has changed over time. Nevertheless, 
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in 2014, Shahnazar (Shahnazar & Hasan, 2014) performed an extensive review on the 
experimental and modeling approaches where she found that, from the total number of 
papers reviewed, the modeling categories are distributed as follows: thermodynamic 
models (50%) ), gas gravity (31%) and, finally, statistical and neural network approaches 
(19%). Shahnazar concluded that further studies on statistical and neural network 
approaches should be considered and should have specific qualities including: 1) 
necessary variables; 2) increased accuracy; and 3) a “Faster and more robust neural 
network algorithm should be used rather than the typical ones.”  
2.4 Kinetic Models of Hydrate Formation    
Kinetic models help to determine when and where the hydrate may form, by 
understanding the growing and agglomeration process as a function of time. During the 
last decade, the oil and gas industry has been exploring the possibility of moving from 
hydrate avoidance techniques towards risk management techniques. There are many 
reasons that support this change. For instance, some systems have a phase equilibria 
(hydrate avoidance) without enough data to analyze and conclude if hydrate formation is 
probable or not. Some studies found that, even under the right conditions for hydrate 
formation (over the hydrate equilibrium curve), hydrates do not form for a period of time 
(Ribeiro & Lage, 2008; Sloan, 2005). Therefore, analyzing a system using hydrate 
avoidance purely based on thermodynamics could have some limitations. Thus, a risk 
management approach helps to study the hydrate formation as a function of time. The 
basis of risk management is the quantification of the hydrate kinetics (Sloan, 2005) that 
are able to enter in the hydrate formation region during operations. Nevertheless, in order 
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to implement risk management strategies, it is fundamental to understand the kinetics of 
hydrates (Ribeiro & Lage, 2008). 
Although the hydrate kinetic process does not undergo any reaction (rather the 
structure is formed by hydrogen bonds), it can be represented by a crystallization process, 
which is defined by two steps: a nucleation process and a growth process (Sloan, 2005). 
Through nucleation, a supersaturated solution creates the right conditions to allow the 
generation of stable hydrate nuclei, which continuously grow during the growth step.  
2.4.1 Hydrate Nucleation  
In 2008, Ribeiro and Lage (Ribeiro & Lage, 2008) developed state-of-the-art 
modeling for hydrate formation kinetics, in which they explained the hydrate formation as 
a “phase change process”, which is induced by a supersaturation environment, and 
described the process as a function of the Gibbs Free Energy. They found that if the ratio 
of the Gibbs Free Energy of the gas solved in the liquid to the Gibbs Free Energy of the 
hydrate is greater than 1, the aggregation of the water and gas molecules is favored. Also, 
the positive variation of the Gibbs Free Energy is associated with the separation of a new 
phase. Therefore, they concluded that the opposite results from the components of the 
Gibbs free energy of the system (Gsys) is related to the size of the cluster. 
In the early stages of the nucleation process, the system is highly dependent on the 
interfacial area. Because of this reason, it has been concluded that the most likely zone for 
nucleation is the gas-liquid interface. The key parameters associated to nucleation are: 
Gibbs Free Energy of the system (Gsys); cluster radius (r); critical radius (rc), which is the 
minimal stable radius; and nucleation time (tnuc), which is defined as “the time interval 
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between the establishment of super-saturation and the formation of the first clusters with 
r = rc (Ribeiro & Lage, 2008).” 
Many studies have been developed to prove the existence of the nucleation time 
and to understand its dependences with different operational conditions. For instance, in 
1993, Skovborg et al. (Skovborg, Ng, Rasmussen, & Mohn, 1993) studied the nucleation 
time of different gases and their mixtures in a stirred reactor and found that “for a given 
pressure and temperature conditions, the value of tnuc was observed to decrease when the 
stirring speed was raised”. Also, in 1987, Englezos et al. (Englezos, 1993) found that the 
nucleation time was highly sensitive to the operating temperatures. Thus, the driving force 
for hydrate nucleation was defined by Skovborg as a function of the chemical potential 
difference for water in the liquid and hydrate phases for specific operating conditions. 
In 1994, Natarajan et al. (Natarajan, Bishnoi, & Kalogerakis, 1994) defined the 
driving force for hydrate nucleation as a function of the fugacity of the guest molecules at 
different phases (gas ‘fi,G’ and hydrate ‘fi,H’) and different conditions (operating and 
equilibrium). Based on this definition, the authors were able to propose a correlation to 
calculate the nucleation time (tnuc) for methane, ethane and carbon dioxide as follows: 
𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑐 = 𝐾 [
𝑓𝑖,𝐺(𝑇𝑂𝑃, 𝑃𝑂𝑃)
𝑓𝑖,𝐻(𝑇𝑂𝑃, 𝑃𝑒𝑞)
− 1]
−𝑚
 
The parameters K and m depend on the properties of the guest molecule and the 
system where it is measured. 
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After reviewing the main parameters that determine the nucleation process, it is 
clear that, in order to have a good model of hydrate nucleation, it is critical to define the 
driving force correctly. In 2002, Kashchiev and Firoozabadi (Kashchiev & Firoozabadi, 
2002) modified the existing definition and defined the driving force as the difference 
between the chemical potential of an old and new phase calling it super-saturation (Δg) 
and expressed it as follows: 
∆𝑔 = 𝜇𝐺𝑆 + 𝑛𝑤𝜇𝑤 − 𝜇𝐻 
In this expression, µGS and µw are the respective chemical potentials of gas and 
water and nw is the water molecule. Finally, µH is the chemical potential of the unit.  
In 2004, Anklam and Firoozabadi defined a new expression for the driving force 
of hydrate formation from gas multicomponent. This expression was developed based on 
the previous work done by Kashchiev and Firoozabadi, which is one of the expressions 
widely used. 
∆𝑔 = 𝑛𝑤[𝜇𝑤(𝑇, 𝑃) − 𝜇𝑤,𝐻(𝑇, 𝑃, 𝑤)] 
 
2.4.2 Hydrate growth  
As Ribeiro and Lage (2008) described in their review, the system (oil, gas and 
water at low temperatures and high pressures) presents a decrement in the Gibbs Free 
Energy when the critical radius is overcome and the nucleus starts growing. As a result, a 
considerable increment of the gas consumption is introduced in the system, representing 
the transition between the nucleation and the growth stages. 
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After the growth stage starts, if a continuous flow of water and gas molecules 
reaches the crystal surface, the growth process is maintained. Although the hydrate 
formation does not involve a chemical reaction but a phase change process, the hydrate 
growth process is able to release energy in the form of heat. This increment of heat could 
negatively impact the driving force, increasing the hydrate decomposition.  
In 1983, Vysniauskas and Bishnoi (Vysniauskas & Bishnoi, 1983) proposed the 
first hydrocarbon hydrate kinetic model based on a methane hydrate formation study 
developed in a stirred semi-bath reactor using cooling jacket. The system was operated at 
a constant pressure, and the temperature was controlled with a cooling system. The study 
measured the gas consumption as a function of time at different operating conditions, 
moving in certain intervals as follows: 274 ≤ T (K) ≤ 284, and 3 ≤ P (MPA) ≤ 10. The 
following semi- empirical expression estimates the methane consumption rate of the 
system during the growth process:  
−
𝑑𝑚𝑔𝑎𝑠
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑘𝐵𝐴𝑆(∆𝑇) 
where mgas represents the mass of the gas consumed, kB is the reaction rate constant, 
AS is the surface area of the interface, and ΔT is the sub-cooling temperature difference.  
Over the years many kinetic models have been developed by different authors, for 
instance: Englezos et al. model (Englezos, 1993), Skovborg and Rasmussen model 
(Skovborg et al., 1993), Herri et al. model (Herri et al., 1999), among others. However, 
one of the more recent studies was developed in 2007 by Boxall et al. (Boxall et al., 2009), 
in which a kinetic model is proposed using Vysniauskas and Bishnoi as a fundamental 
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equation for the model. The model was named Colorado School of Mines hydrate kinetic 
(CSMHyK) and later incorporated the transient multiphase program, OLGA (Boxall et al., 
2009).  The Boxall et al. model was developed under the following assumptions: “hydrate 
particles convert directly from emulsified water droplets, nucleation occurs at a sub-
cooling temperature of 6.5 oF, and, once the hydrate is formed, the model assumes that 
these particles remain in the oil phase.” 
Although the Boxall et al. model has been widely implemented in different 
companies, the kinetic model of hydrate formation is not fully understood, and the models 
are still associated with a high level of uncertainty, especially for the oil dominated 
systems.  
2.5 Prevention, Mitigation and Remediation Techniques:   
The oil and gas industry has recognized hydrate formation issues as one of the 
major concerns in flow assurance problems. Although the hydrate formation phenomena 
is not completely understood, academia and industry have been implementing different 
techniques. As it was mentioned by Kinnari et al. in 2014, there are three main parts of 
hydrate control: 1) the understanding of when and where a hydrate issue can be present 
(prediction), 2) knowing the preventive and mitigation strategies (methods) to implement 
depending on the system (prevention), and 3) knowing and being prepared to remediate 
the hydrate issue (problem-solving). These three components are known as the 3P’s of 
hydrate control (Kinnari, Hundseid, Li, & Askvik, 2014). 
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Some of the hydrate control techniques include chemical methods (use of 
inhibitors); thermal methods (insulation, direct electric heating, heat tracing, bundles); 
hydraulic methods (fluid displacement, gas sweep, depressurization, compression, and 
dense phase, pigging systems); and process solutions (gas dehydration, water cut 
reduction) (Kinnari et al., 2014). Nevertheless, during the last decade, the oil and gas 
industry has widely implemented chemical and thermal methods as a part of their 
prevention strategies.  
2.5.1 Chemical Methods (Inhibitors) 
The main function of hydrate inhibitors is modifying the equilibrium phase, the 
kinetics, and/or the agglomeration process by adding solutes to the water. The inhibitors 
can be classified as follows:  
A. Thermodynamic inhibitors (THI): The chemicals more commonly used in this 
category are methanol (MeOH) and monoethylene glycol (MEG) which shift the 
hydrate equilibrium curve to the left of the phase diagram, moving it to the extreme 
equilibrium conditions (low temperatures and high pressures) as shown in Figure 
8 reprinted with permission from (Notz, 1994). 
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               Figure 8. Deep water pipeline with hydrate curve at 
                 different MeOH concentrations. Reprinted with permission from (Notz, 1994). 
 
The action mechanism is driven by a reaction between the methanol and water, 
reducing the water molecules available to interact with the light gases to avoid the 
hydrate formation. Nevertheless, there are some advantages and disadvantages 
associated with each one. Although MeOH is more effective, cost efficient, and 
has a low viscosity (which reduces the pump requirements), it possesses a large 
HSE risk, because it is highly volatile (flash point of 51.8 oF). An additional 
drawback of using methanol is that a too high methanol concentrations in the crude 
oil can exceed product specifications (50 ppm of MeOH) leading to quality 
problems. It is not uncommon to exceed these limits, because methanol cannot be 
removed from the crude oil in a cost effective way (Patel & Russum, 2010; Tian 
et al., 2011). On the other hand, using MEG could be more expensive, it definitely 
possesses less risk. MEG has corrosion protective benefits, it can be recovered, 
and it is economically feasible, making it a long-term solution. Nonetheless, the 
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effectiveness depends on the good conditions which need to be assessed (Bui, 
2016). 
In general, the use of any type of THI can bring different drawbacks, for instance: 
high volume of inhibitor requirements (i.e., 30 to 60% by volume of methanol 
based on aqueous phase) (Patel & Russum, 2010), contamination, scaling 
problems, safety concerns (MeOH), and reduction of the production rates (Tian et 
al., 2011).  
B. Low Dosage inhibitors (LDHI): There are two types of inhibitors under this 
category, including Kinetic Inhibitors (KI), which are able to retard crystal growth 
and/or nucleation for a specific period of time. This period of time is called 
“induction time” which depends on the subcooling temperature. Also, the AAs are 
surfactants that interrupt the formation of hydrate crystals through the active 
surface which are attached to the small particles (nucleus), preventing the 
agglomeration by creating a hydrophobic surface. During the last two decades, a 
large number of LDHIs have been studied as alternatives to replace THI and 
overcome certain issues associated to the use of THI. One of these issues involves 
the high inhibitor injection rate which requires a large storage capacity, which pose 
a safety concern for the system. Typical injection rates of LDH are around 0.5-2.0 
% by volume (Patel & Russum, 2010). 
Kinetic inhibitors (KI) are generally water soluble polymers, including polymers 
based in homo-polymers and copolymers of vinyl caprolactam (Vcap) (Chua et al., 
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2012). Kinetic inhibitors are environmentally friendly and can be operated at low 
cost; these are some of the advantages of using KI. However, these inhibitors have 
a number of performance limitations in systems with high concentrations of H2S 
and CO2 and high sub-cooling temperature, because the majority of KI available 
are not designed for severe conditions (Al-Eisa et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, AAs do not depend on sub-cooling temperatures, because, in 
this case, the system allows small crystals to form and disperse within the oil layers 
(Bui, 2016). However, these have two key limitations: a water cut range in which 
they are more efficient (40-60% water cut) and a topside emulsion formation which 
depend on the system conditions (Patel & Russum, 2010). Also, AAs have some 
other limitations, including salt concentration in the water, in which having a 
concentration between 1.5-3.0 wt.% of salts leads to poor performance, also high 
GOR values in gas condensate systems is other limitation (Patel et al., 2011).  
2.5.2 Thermal Methods (Insulation) 
The intent of these methods relies on maintaining the temperature of the fluid over 
the hydrate formation temperature, preventing the system from falling within the hydrate 
equilibrium curve (hydrate zone). Different methods have been proposed in this category, 
however, the cost-benefit of their application is always a concern. Therefore, the 
application of these methods is frequently found in equipment close to the wellhead and/or 
short pipelines and flowlines. Thermal methods are often implemented during the earliest 
stages of the project. One of the common thermal methods used in industry are discussed 
below:  
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A. Insulation: the purpose of the insulation is to avoid heat transfer to the 
environment, maintaining the heat of the system using materials or fluids with low 
thermal conductivity. Materials, such as polyurethane, can be formed into layers 
with different thicknesses, depending on the requirements of the system (Wilfred 
& Appah, 2015). Also, the annulus can be filled with different fluids with low 
thermal conductivities. In a study developed by Owodunni et al. , the effectiveness 
of the insulating materials was found using flow conditions as prevention with the 
heat loss reduced at shut down conditions (Owodunni & Ajienka, 2007).  
2.5.3 Hydraulic Methods (depressurization) 
Depressurization is the common method used in this category, which involves 
dissociating the hydrate plug in-place. This method is part of the remediation measures, 
and it can be implemented in drilling or production operations. Also, it is simple to apply, 
and the expenses of the application are low. 
The purpose of the depressurization process is to reduce the pressure, trying to 
place the system conditions outside of the hydrate zone (under the hydrate equilibrium 
curve). Depending on the hydrate plug location, the depressurization process can present 
isenthalpic rapid expansion (i.e., through a valve) and very slow depressurization (i.e., in 
a large volume pipeline) (Sloan Jr & Koh, 2007). Therefore, the hydrate becomes 
thermodynamically unstable. Figure 9 reprinted with permission from (Sloan Jr & Koh, 
2007) shows a representation of both situations. 
 31 
 
 
Figure 9. Temperature changes as a result of depressurization (1) isenthalpic rapid expansion as 
through a valve, and (2) very slow depressurization, as in a large-volume region. Reprinted with 
permission from (Sloan Jr & Koh, 2007). 
 
The depressurization method used for hydrate remediation can be implemented 
from both sides of the blockage or only from one side. The choice of the method will 
depend on the configuration of the system (e.g., flowline, wellbore, riser). Although 
depressurization from only one side of the blockage is possible, it is recommended to 
implement a two-side depressurization due to safety concerns (i.e., to prevent that the 
hydrate plug becomes a high speed projectile). For systems where hydrate formation is 
expected and depressurization is considered a remediation alternative, this design should 
be defined in the earliest stages of the project, as a modification during production may 
not be feasible. 
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2.5.4 Process Solution (water reduction) 
The basis of the process solution is to reduce the amount of water available to form 
hydrates, either in gas or oil systems. There are some challenges associated with the water 
removal process because hydrates can form even when water concentration is very low 
(ppm range). Also hydrates can form in the vapor space of multiphase systems. On the 
other hand, an approximate amount of 3 Barrel of Water Per Day (BWPD) is produced 
from the oil well (SPE-International, 2016), which requires a large process surface facility 
with high associated costs.  
2.6 Hydrate Management Systems (HMS):   
Throughout the last two decades, companies have started to implement specific 
systems to manage the hydrate issues in their operations. Once a system is established, it 
becomes easy to evaluate its implementation and the risk associated to hydrate plugging, 
which is the fundamental problem in managing the hydrate formation (Kinnari et al., 
2014). As it was mentioned in Section 2.5 above, there are different methods to prevent, 
mitigate and remediate the hydrates, which can be incorporated into the HMS. Currently, 
the system includes different components, such as topside processing facilities, metering, 
monitoring, hydrate formation prediction (simulations), operator analysis based on the 
metering and simulations (human knowledge and intervention), application and control of 
the preventive methods (THI and/or LDHI), mitigation and remediation methods. 
However, there is not a unique HSM. Every company implements the most convenient 
methods for their facilities due to their unique operational discipline, resources, and, most 
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importantly, their own product compositions, which makes it difficult to standardize an 
HMS. 
Companies have customized their own HMS based on their experience and 
resources. For instance, OneSubsea (Schlumberger) uses MEG, which is a THI, as the 
primary preventive method to avoid hydrate formation (Lupeau, Smith, Seng, & Grzelak-
OneSubsea, 2016), while Halliburton uses LDHI, which needs a constant vigilance of the 
data-flows and conditions for every part of the system (Patel, 2015). The two previous 
examples provide a comparison between hydrate avoidance versus hydrate management 
(or risk management), in which the hydrates are allowed to form as small crystals but are 
controlled by interrupting their growth process (KHI) or the agglomeration process (AAs). 
Therefore, the factors that may influence the overall risk in one (OneSubsea) HMS are not 
the same in another HMS (Halliburton).  
Table 2. Qualitative comparison of the avoidance approach vs. risk management approach systems 
Component Avoidance Approach (THI) 
Risk Management 
(LDHI) 
 
Hydrate formation 
prediction 
(simulations) 
1) Dependence on the 
thermodynamic models: (High)  
2) Dependence on the Kinetic 
Models (Low)  
1) Dependence on the 
thermodynamic models: 
(High)  
2) Dependence on the Kinetic 
Models (High) 
Operators analysis 
based on the 
metering and 
simulations 
High  High  
Metering  High  High 
Monitoring Level of Vigilance (Medium) Level of Vigilance (High) 
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Table 2 Continued 
Component Avoidance Approach (THI) 
Risk Management 
(LDHI) 
Human interface 
level 
Medium  High   
Hydrate formation 
allowed 
NO YES 
Level of safety  Safer approach  Less safe approach 
Operating 
expenditure 
(OPEX) 
High  Medium 
 
Table 2 shows differences between the two approaches, in which each component 
has different uncertainties. An example of the uncertainties associated with each HMS is 
mentioned by Lupeau A. et al. (2016). He explained the HMS of OneSubsea where the 
system starts in the PureMEG that is the regeneration process located in the topside of the 
facilities and is used to recover the MEG up to 95% as shown in Figure 10 adapted from 
(Lupeau et al., 2016):  
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Figure 10. Schematic of OneSubsea Hydrate Management Systems. Adapted from (Lupeau et al., 
2016). 
 
As the author mentioned, measurements, in general, are fundamental to assess the 
risk associated with hydrate plugging, especially the wet-gas water or water cut 
measurements. These measurements bring a lot of challenges related to the technologies 
available. Lupeau A. et al. also mentioned that, “significant changes in water properties 
(i.e., salinity) will affect the water measurement accuracy of any device;” therefore, 
recorded data through the field life is essential. Currently, the Vx PHASEWATCHE 
device is being used to measure different flow rates, because it is an inline flowmeter that 
is able to measure three-phase flow rates (oil, water, and gas). However, OneSubsea 
developed a new device called AQUAWATCHER (conductivity probe) in which the 
principle is a microwave reflection measurement. This device has a lower uncertainty in 
measuring water composition. Nevertheless, Lupeau A. et al. mentioned that the 
parameters that operators want to monitor, in order to have effective operation, are all 
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related to flow rate (gas, condensates, vapor water, condensate water, and formation water) 
and salinity.    
These measurements will then be used to continually simulate the flow using the 
incorporated software called OLGA, which will help the operator to identify any alert of 
hydrate formation and also help to determine the amount of inhibitor needed. The inhibitor 
is delivered into the flowline through a system involving different equipment: chemical 
injection unit (topside), umbilical, and chemical injection valve, among others. In general, 
an HMS is a highly complex system that involves different factors with real time 
operations, which can accumulate uncertainty in the final calculation of the risk associated 
with hydrate plugging. Figure 11 adapted from (Grzelak & Bussell, 2015), shows a 
representation of the accumulating and compounding uncertainties (Grzelak & Bussell, 
2015). 
 
Figure 11. Accumulating and Compounding Uncertainties. Adapted from (Grzelak & Bussell, 2015). 
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2.7 Quantitative Risk Analysis and Probabilistic Approach:   
Cost-benefit is the main driving factor to look for a different approach to control 
the issues associated with hydrate formation (Sloan, 2005). This is reasonable since the 
ultimate objective of any operator company is to produce oil and gas in a cost effective 
way. However, any approach to control hydrate formation has an inherent risk that can 
lead to different consequences, including economic, environmental, and/or health (human 
losses). Thus, each company has their own risk appetite in which the risk acceptance level 
will vary. Consequently, it becomes important to know the total risk associated with the 
HMS in a comprehensive manner.  
As it was mentioned in section 2.6, the HMS has different components. Therefore, 
in order to understand the total risk associated with the system, it is necessary to know the 
risk associated with each component. 
Predicting when and where the hydrate might form, poses a large uncertainty due 
to the inaccurate models used to develop this analysis. Currently, the most used model to 
predict hydrate risk is called CSMHyFAST, which is incorporated into a transient flow 
simulator (OLGA) and is able to calculate different aspects of the hydrate phenomena in 
oil dominated systems, including nucleation (formation), growth parameters, pressure 
drop and relative viscosity. In 2012,  Zerpa (Zerpa, Sloan, Koh, & Sum, 2012) defined a 
risk criteria based on the gas hydrate model. This risk criteria is defined by three 
performance measures: pressure drop, volume fraction of the hydrate particles, and 
relative viscosity. Also, it was divided into three risk levels (low, intermediate, and high) 
as listed in Table 3. 
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Similarly, in 2015, Chaudhari (Chaudhari, 2016) developed a study on hydrate risk 
quantification in oil and gas production focused on oil dominated systems named 
CSMHyK; this model is still in an early stage.  Chaudhari concluded that, although the 
risk criteria established by Zerpa in 2012 is a good approximation, it might not be 
applicable to others systems such as oil dominated. Therefore, it can be confirmed that 
this risk model is still limited and is not based on a probabilistic approach.  
 The aforementioned risk models depend on certain inputs, including the hydrate 
equilibrium curve (phase diagram) that is obtained from different thermodynamic models 
which, at the same time, hold a level of uncertainty. For instance, in 2015, a study 
developed by Hearth et al. proposed a basic probabilistic method to determine the hydrate 
equilibrium curve, not derived from point values but from probabilistic curves outside of 
the hydrate zone, for any given operational condition. Figure 12 reprinted with permission 
from (Herath et al., 2015), shows the probability of hydrate formation within the operating 
range. 
Table 3. Risk criteria for a qualitative assessment (Zerpa et al., 2012). 
Risk Level Pressure drop  
ΔPflowline (psi) 
Volume particle of the 
hydrate Φhyd 
Relative viscosity 
µr 
Low ΔPflowline < 300 Φhyd < 0.10 µr < 10 
Intermediate  300 < ΔPflowline < 500 0.10 <  Φhyd  < 0.40 10 <  µr  < 100 
High  ΔPflowline > 500 Φhyd  > 0.40 µr  > 100 
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Figure 12. General phase diagram with probability curves under the hydrate equilibrium (left); 
Phase diagram of 99% CH4 and 1% C2H6 with the probability representation under the hydrate 
equilibrium (right). Reprinted with permission from (Herath, Khan, Rathnayaka, & Rahman, 2015) 
 
A probabilistic approach allows for a better understanding of the problem and its 
associated uncertainties. Therefore, it is also necessary to understand the kinetic and flow 
models using probabilistic approaches. A study completed by Herath and Faisal, in 2016, 
implemented a probabilistic approach during the design phase in order to prevent hydrate 
formation (Herath, Khan, & Yang, 2016). However, there is not one study that integrates 
the whole Hydrate Management System and determines the probability of hydrate 
plugging in the system while integrating all the components of the HMS. Thus, the present 
study proposed a framework as the first step towards this direction. 
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3 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
This section describes the proposed framework for modeling the operational risk 
of the Hydrate Management System (HMS), which is composed of three areas. The 
framework includes an integration of pure deterministic methods with probabilistic 
techniques through the application of Bayesian Networks (BN). This approach will help 
identify the interdependencies among the individual interfaces, processes, and their 
components related to hydrate risk management. The outcome of this framework will 
provide a better understanding of how individual components might affect other 
components as well as the whole hydrate management system. 
3.1 Framework: “Modeling Operational Risk of Hydrate Management Systems 
Using Bayesian Networks” 
This basic framework was developed as part of modeling the operational risk in a 
hydrate management system. The proposed approach will help identify interfaces among 
the different components of subsea systems and determine their conditional dependencies 
with the purpose of modeling and managing the risk of hydrate formation and providing a 
tool for better decision making. This basic framework (Figure 13) is further divided into 
three main areas of study: 
3.1.1 Area 1 (Scenario definition and causal & consequence modeling) 
This area focuses on defining the subsea scenarios. Depending on how well the 
scenarios are defined, the dependencies between the different components will be easy to 
understand. 
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Figure 13. Modeling operational risk of hydrate management 
3.1.1.1  Scenario Definition 
This study is focused on the production operations from wellhead to topside, 
including equipment such as the Christmas tree, jumpers, manifolds, flowlines, risers, and 
topside processes. The scenario can include different equipment based on the activity 
involved, such as normal operations, shutdown, or start up. For example, an unplanned 
well shutdown can be caused by different reasons, including failure of any subsea 
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equipment (hydraulic leak or electrical failure), High- High (HH) or Low-Low (LL) on 
pressure and temperature alarm systems, failure in subsea control equipment, or software 
failure, among others. Hydrate formation is one of the biggest concerns during an 
unplanned shutdown, because the equipment becomes cold due to the temperature of the 
surrounding environment. This phenomenon is commonly known as a thermal-related risk 
(Ellerton & Chauvet, 2009). During an unplanned shutdown, there may not be enough 
time to implement the whole procedure to depressurize, inhibit, or purge, which helps 
avoid hydrate formation (Ellerton & Chauvet, 2009). In such a case, the absence of the 
aforementioned procedures can allow the trapped fluids to reach the conditions necessary 
for hydrates to form. 
The total time from the moment of shutdown until the system reaches hydrate 
formation conditions is defined as the “cooldown time.” Therefore, operators use the 
cooldown time to solve the situation, which is usually around 20 hours. The cooldown 
time is broken into three different times (Bai & Bai, 2012): a) ‘No touch time’- hydrate 
mitigation is not necessary. This is around four hours and is used to prepare the plan in 
case the operation is not recovered. B) ‘Light touch time’- methanol is injected into dead 
leg areas: for example, trees, well tubing and tree jumpers. C) ‘‘Displacement time’- live 
crude content in the flowlines is displaced. The whole process involves technical and 
management components that need to be studied as a general picture in order to identify 
causation and be able to control it. A similar situation happens at every scenario, like 
normal operations. 
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3.1.1.2  Definition of formation avoidance measures in the system 
Based on the scenario and case study, the formation avoidance measure could be 
different. It might include not only one measure but also a combination of different 
measures, including Hydrate Inhibitors (THI and LDHI), Electrical Heating (DEH and 
ETH), and Isolation Systems. However, the developed framework is designed to assess 
the operational risk associated with the hydrate management systems used to control 
hydrate formation through the life of the field, rather than assessing the engineering 
design. Certainly, the design parameters will be taken into account, as part of the inputs in 
some of the simulations, in order to estimate the amount of inhibitor required to ensure 
straightforward operations. 
3.1.1.3  Fault tree development 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive method that helps identify ways in which hazards 
can lead to incidents (Crowl and Louvar 2011). The analysis starts with a well-defined 
incident (top event) and works backwards towards the different intermediate or basic 
events that can lead to the incident. Considering that hydrate formation events are highly 
complex phenomena that depend on many variables, either technical or managerial, it is 
important to understand the basic event or events that can lead to failure due to hydrate 
formation (plugging). 
The top event considered in this study is defined as a loss of control, which can 
lead to an uncontrollable hydrate formation and might form a plug. Therefore, the 
proposed factors to include in the fault tree are human, equipment and software 
reliabilities. Most of the hydrate management systems used across the oil and gas industry 
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include a considerable level of human intervention, such as monitoring operational 
variables, competencies, and communication. Thus, human reliability can represent the 
basic event of the hydrate management system. The equipment reliability of the inhibitor 
injection, including pumps, valves, lines (topside), control systems, dynamic or static 
umbilical, distribution module, etc. should be included in the total measure of the risk. 
Finally, the software reliability is highly important to estimate the inhibitor composition 
necessary to prevent hydrate formation and to predict when and where hydrates will form. 
However, thermodynamic models and kinetic models do not always perform an accurate 
prediction. Although current thermodynamic models are accurate enough, they are not 
suitable to predict hydrate formation under changing oil and gas compositions, such as 
high salt content and ultrahigh pressures/deep waters. In addition, the kinetic mechanism 
of hydrate formation is not fully understood yet. Therefore, the existing hydrate kinetic 
models are not highly precise, which can bring some uncertainty into the system. The 
reliability of this calculation might depend on different factors, including the input quality, 
model uncertainty, and the competencies of the person (or group of people) developing 
the simulation calculation. 
The mathematical and probabilistic development is driven by the combination of 
the component failures, the cut sets (basic events), and the way these events are 
interconnected by the logic gates (Ericson, 2015). The most common gates used in process 
safety systems are AND and OR, which are defined as follows (Table 4): 
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There are more logic functions, including Priority AND, Exclusive OR, and 
Inhibit. However, for this approach only AND & OR are used. The calculations become 
complex when there are more than two component failures or cut sets. 
3.1.1.4  Event tree development  
Event tree analysis is a logical technique that helps to determine the event 
sequences for a specific situation through a single initiating event. In process safety, event 
trees are widely used to determine the initiating event and identify all possible 
consequences that can lead to a failure. 
The initiating event considered in this study is defined as a loss of control leading 
to uncontrollable hydrate formation. The mitigation barriers included in the event tree are 
related to the subsequent actions needed to reduce and control the possible consequences. 
Therefore, event trees will be different depending on established procedures in each 
company and for each possible scenario. The possible events to include in the event tree 
Table 4. AND & OR gates definition (Ericson, 2015). 
Gate 
Symbol 
Representation 
Definition Math expression
AND 
The output occurs if 
both inputs occur 
P(1 AND 2) = P(1)*P(2) = 
P(1)+P(2) 
OR 
The output occurs if 
one out of both 
inputs occurs 
P(1 OR 2) = P(1)+P(2)-
[P(1)*P(2)] 
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are alarm monitoring, human interventions (human factors), emergency shutdowns, and 
the hydrate depressurizing process, among others. 
3.1.1.5  Bowtie development 
Bowtie analysis (Fenton & Neil, 2012) is a combination of two types of operational 
risk models: fault tree (left side) and event tree (right side). The threats and consequences 
are tied together using the resulting hazardous event (represented by the knot). 
Figure 14. Hydrate formation Bowtie. 
The proposed bowtie analysis for hydrate formation is included in the framework 
where some of the threats involved are related to human, equipment, and software 
reliabilities. The possible consequences considered are production losses and 
environmental, safety, and health effects.  
3.1.2 Area 2  (Bowtie mapping as Bayesian Network ) 
The second area is focused on mapping the bowtie into a Bayesian Network using 
AgenaRisk or any other suitable software in order to quantify the risk of hydrate formation, 
including different components of the system. 
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The biggest challenge in risk assessment is to estimate small and reliable 
probabilities for rare, catastrophic events (i.e., rupture of a flowline due to an 
uncontrollable hydrate formation) (Fenton & Neil, 2012). These events do not allow 
accumulation of enough data to determine their frequency (Fenton & Neil, 2012). 
Therefore, a value of these small and rare probabilities can be estimated by applying a 
causal model in the system of interest. A causal model, such as a bowtie, estimates the 
probability of a rare, catastrophic event through a number of connected processes that 
prevent, control, or mitigate the event. It is desirable to estimate that probability, for 
example through a bowtie (Fenton & Neil, 2012). Thus, mapping a bowtie into a Bayesian 
Network helps to develop statistical/probabilistic modeling and to identify the direct 
dependencies of the system.   
3.1.3 Area 3  (Software uncertainty measurements ) 
This area is mainly focused on studying the possible uncertainties associated with 
each software calculation performed during the operation of the hydrate management 
system. Depending on the subsea scenario, it could involve thermodynamic or kinetic 
calculations using different software, including PVTsim, Multiflash, CSMGem, 
PROMAX, and OLGA (Hydrate Package). 
Although the hydrate formation has been described as a deterministic problem, and 
almost all thermodynamic and kinetic models are deterministic, the uncertainties related 
to their outcomes need to be estimated when used to support operational decisions. 
Uncertainty is frequently expressed as a probability distribution, which specifies the 
likelihood of the possible outcomes. Uncertainty comes from diverse sources and can be 
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divided into six different classes: inherent randomness, measurement error, systematic 
error, natural variation, model uncertainty, and subjective judgment. Therefore, the most 
important type of uncertainty associated with this problem is related to the models, 
because as mentioned before, the hydrate formation mechanism is not completely 
understood. Hence, it is valid to mention that the existing kinetic models are an unrefined 
abstraction of the natural system. Although there is not a clear path to estimate the 
uncertainties in complex systems, there are some that can be evaluated in order to identify 
a suitable approach for each system such as (Uusitalo, Lehikoinen, Helle, & Myrberg, 
2015): expert assessment, model sensitivity analysis, model emulation, temporal or spatial 
variability in the deterministic models, multiple models, and data-based approaches. 
Therefore, the framework (Figure 13) proposes to apply a model sensitivity 
analysis or uncertainty analysis (if available) as a first approach. In a sensitivity analysis, 
the model inputs are varied to determine how the model outputs respond so inputs that 
produce the most significant changes in the outputs can be identified. However, only the 
uncertainty in the model inputs can be accounted for in this approach and not the intrinsic 
uncertainties in the model’s structure (i.e., model approximations, functional relationships 
between variables) (Uusitalo et al., 2015). Thus, other approaches to obtain the uncertainty 
in the model’s structure can be part of this studies too.  
3.1.3.1  Sensitivity  and uncertainty analysis 
A common practice in developing a sensitivity and uncertainty analysis is using a 
Monte Carlo method. However, considering the complexity of the thermodynamic and 
kinetic hydrate models, the framework proposes to use a Latin Hypercube method to build 
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a random input matrix. The Latin Hypercube method is a modification of a Monte Carlo 
method in which the number of models to run (n) is lower and, at the same time, 
representative. The last step is to implement a mathematical model to define the 
probability distribution.  
 
  
50 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, the proposed framework for determining the risk of hydrate 
formation to a subsea process was applied to a hypothetical case study. The main objective 
of this exercise was to establish a proof of concept and show how this framework could 
be applied in industry. This case study was also intended to identify areas of improvement 
that can be used to define a path forward for this research. 
The case study was built from data obtained in a literature review and the test system 
was a hypothetical chemical injection skid for a subsea production system. Therefore, a 
few assumptions were made to define the conditions of the case study. These assumptions 
will be defined at the time they are used. 
4.1 Case study 
The test system consists of an oil and gas field developed via a single wellhead and 
a single flowline. The flowline transports natural gas from a satellite platform to a process 
facility. The process uses injection of thermodynamic inhibitors together with thermal 
isolation (polyethylene isolation layer with thickness equal to 5x10-4 inches) as preventive 
method for controlling hydrate formation. The asset uses a chemical injection skid for 
supplying the thermodynamic inhibitor. The company that operates the asset has a hydrate 
management system in place, which is implemented by the engineers and operators. Table 
5 and Table 6 list the equipment used in the case study and the conditions and parameters 
are provided in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9 (Wilfred & Appah, 2015). 
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Table 5. Top side equipment considered. 
Topside 
Equipment Description 
Pump and Line Transports the inhibitor from the storage to the injection system 
Regular Valve Chemical injection pump discharge valve 
Control systems Part of the chemical injection skid which is located on deck 
 
Table 6. Subsea equipment considered. 
Topside 
Equipment Description 
Dynamic umbilical  
Transports the inhibitor from the storage to the injection 
system 
Distribution module Distributes the inhibitor as needed over the seabed 
Subsea control 
system  
Control the distribution of the inhibitors over the sea bed  
X-mas tree 
Stack of valves installed on a wellhead to provide a 
controllable interface between the well and production 
facilities (Chemical injection points)  
Flowmeter and water 
sensor  
Measure the flowrate and water concentration on the system. 
This information is used to calculate the required inhibitor rate. 
 
Table 7. Boundary Conditions (Wilfred & Appah, 2015). 
Parameters Description Units  
Fluid inlet pressure at satellite platform  1,800 Psia 
Fluid inlet temperature at satellite platform  82.4 °F 
Minimum arrival temperature at processing facility 78.8 °F 
Minimum arrival pressure at processing facility  1,200 Psia 
Design fluid flow rate  8,605,440 m3/d 
Maximum turndown  4,302,720 m3/d 
 
 
 52 
 
 
Table 8. Natural Gas Composition 
(Wilfred & Appah, 2015). 
Gas Composition Mole Percent 
N2 0.16 
CO2 1.02 
H2O 0.39 
C1 75.42 
C2 7.65 
C3 4.27 
n-C4 8.42 
n-C5 2.67 
 
 
Table 9. Temperature along the flowline length (Wilfred & Appah, 2015). 
Temperature of the system in function of the length  
Length (miles) 0.62 1.24 1.86 2.49 3.10 3.73 4.35 4.97 
Temperature (◦F) 80.6 78.8 77 74.3 71.6 68 63.5 60.8 
 
The general assumptions for this case study are:  
 The injection system does not have any spare equipment.  
 There is only one flowmeter and water sensor for the whole system.  
 All failure rates provided use year as a base. 
 Inhibitor concentration 10% mol. 
4.2 Framework application & results 
Area 1: The scenario conditions, parameters, and preventive measures are defined 
in section 4.1. The fault tree developed from the case study is shown in Figure 15.  
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The top event is defined as a loss of control that could lead to an “uncontrollable 
hydrate formation.” It is assumed that there are two main threats, or events that 
immediately lead to the top event; “failure of hydrate formation detection (A)” and “failure 
of hydrate formation control (B).” Both components must fail in order the top event to 
occur. Therefore, these two events (components) are interconnected by an AND gate as 
shown in Figure 15.  
A. Failure of hydrate formation detection: When assessing hydrate formation, the 
first step is the evaluation of the phase diagram (or envelope) of the system. This 
diagram is commonly used to define the operating zones, which is useful for 
determining the conditions at which hydrates can be present on the system at a 
given conditions. Instruments such as flowmeters and water sensors are used to 
obtain information from seabed conditions to create the phase diagram at regular 
intervals, especially when conditions of the fluid change (e.g., water composition). 
Therefore, the reliability of those sensors is key when assessing the risk of hydrate 
formation. One additional factor to consider is that all the changes in the operating 
variables are monitored by humans. Subsea control room operators must respond 
to critical alarms caused by changes to the main variables beyond a predetermined 
operating window (operating outside this envelope, could result in entering the 
zone of hydrate formation). The failure of this component “A” involve the three 
factors proposed in the framework: a) human response failure; b) equipment 
failure; and c) software failure. In this case the components are interconnected 
 54 
 
using an AND gate, because event if two of the components fail the detection can 
still be successful. 
i. Human response failure (failure to respond to excursions outside 
operation envelope of T, P and other variables): as part of the HMS, there 
is a high dependence on monitoring many variables, for example 
monitoring pressure trends. In this case, a pressure drop could be caused 
by hydrate formation and the operator should be able to recognize this type 
of events.  Typically, there are three basic events associated with human 
response failure: (1) signal is not monitored (operator lost attention); (2) 
communication error (i.e., there was not adequate communication of the 
actions to be taken); and (3) signal interpretation failure (there was a 
misunderstanding of the variables shown in the monitor).  
ii. Equipment failure: as mentioned in the previous chapter, flow rate and 
water concentration measurement are key parameters that need to be 
continually monitored to detect the conditions that could lead to hydrate 
formation. However, there are many threats that could result in instrument 
failure including corrosion, erosion, vibration, restrictions, and blockages. 
Since these sensors provide information for assessing the possible 
formation of hydrates, the failure of the flowmeter and the water content 
sensors was also incorporated as part of the system analyzed in this case 
study. In Figure 15 below, the respective failure for these instruments have 
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been assumed to depend on three basic events: Setting error (4 and 8); Rule 
violation (5 and 9); and hardware failure (6 and 7).  
iii. Software failure: software can fail due to many causes; however, for this 
academic exercise, a simplification was made and only three of those 
causes were considered as part of the failure events. Figure 15 shows that 
these causes are interconnected using an OR gate. Here, incorrect inputs, 
calculation uncertainty, and employee competence are the three reasons 
considered in this study. Their respective basic events are shown in Figure 
15: incorrect inputs - failure of electronic devices and instrument 
measuring uncertainty (10 and 11), employee skills – wrong understanding 
and wrong interpretation (12 and 13), uncertainty of the models (14 and 
15).  
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          Figure 15. Hypothetical case study fault tree including different factors that can influence hydrate management. 
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B. Failure of hydrate formation control: this component can fail if the chemical 
injection systems fail or if there is a wrong estimation of the hydrate inhibitors 
concentration needed to control the hydrate formation. Because, if any of the two 
subcomponents fail the component fail. Hence, it is interconnected with and OR gate.  
i. Chemical injection system failure: as it was defined previously, the 
inhibitor injection system consists of subsea and topsides systems. Failure 
of the topsides system involves the following basic events: pump failure 
(16); chemical injection discharge valve failure (17); distribution line 
failure (18); control system failure (19). On the other hand, the failure of 
the subsea system involves the following basic events: dynamic umbilical 
failure (20). Note event at high concentrations of inhibitor there are reports 
of hydrate formation inside the umbilical (20); distribution module failure 
(21); subsea control failure (22); X-Mas tree failure / injection system 
failure (23). For these type of failures, it is assumed that if any of equipment 
mentioned above fail, the flow of inhibitor into the system is interrupted.  
ii. Failure to estimate the inhibitor concentration: incorrect inputs and 
operator competence is considered to influence in this event (10, 11, 12 and 
13). The only different is that the uncertainty of the software is measured 
including inhibitor composition.  
 
 
 58 
 
Event tree development: An event tree for this case study is shown in Figure 16. The 
initiating event is defined as a loss of control leading to an “uncontrollable hydrate 
formation.” In order to mitigate the consequences, certain operational procedures are 
defined as part of the response.  The event tree has been developed from literature review 
and from inputs provided by flow assurance specialists from industry. Note that an event 
tree can vary significantly from company to company, as these event trees are dependent 
on the specific scenarios considered and the specific hydrate mitigation protocols / 
procedures followed by each company. Once the initiating event occurs, it can lead to 
different consequences including asset damage and safety and environmental impact, 
depending on the operational procedures and technologies used.  On the other hand, if the 
right-hand side barriers (mitigations) work as intended, the initiating event can be 
controlled. Once hydrate is formed, part of the remediation process is to identify the 
location of the plug and initiate a recovery process to remove this plug.  
 
Figure 16. Hypothetical case study event tree, including different events after the initiator event, 
"Uncontrollable hydrate formation.” 
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In this case study “following procedures” is the first barrier on the right-hand side 
of the mitigation system. This barrier depends on human factors related to training, 
experience, and ability to react to similar situations. Part of the procedure could involve 
hydraulic methods and depressurization processes without a full shutdown of the system. 
However, as any other barrier requiring human intervention, this barrier is not 100% 
reliable. The second mitigation action is the activation of the “emergency shutdown 
system”, which can be activated automatically or directly by the operator. The reliability 
of the emergency shutdown system is considered high. The third mitigation barrier 
considered is the so called “hydrate depressurization process”, which is a field procedure 
implemented to remove and/or dissociate the hydrate blockage in the system. Finally, the 
last barrier considered is the “emergency response (major intervention)”, which involves 
all the processes implemented in response to an environmental spill. 
Bowtie into development: The bowtie approach is an integration of the fault tree and 
the event tree. Since the top event and the initiator event are the same for both the causal 
model (Fault tree - Figure 15) and the consequence model (Event tree –Figure 16), both 
can be linked to get a bowtie of the general hydrate management system for the 
hypothetical case study. 
Figure 17, shows a bowtie representation of the hypothetical hydrate management 
system. The left-hand side of the bowtie includes the preventive controls and the right-
hand side the mitigation controls. If the left-hand side controls (preventive measures) fail 
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and the conditions of the systems are within the zone where hydrate formation is possible, 
then it is possible that the system will form a plug. This event is represented in the bowtie 
by the “knot”, which is defined as an AND gate between the probability of hydrate 
formation and the probability of the failure preventive measures per year. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Hydrate formation Bowtie. 
 
 
Area 2: Bowtie mapping as Bayesian Network. The next step in the process to model the 
operational risk of the HMS is to map the bowtie in a Bayesian Network using AgenaRisk 
and assign probability data as follows:  
Human reliability: the information used in all the basic events related with human 
reliability, are based on the assumption that the human factors associated to any operation 
in offshore systems are similar. Therefore, the probabilities of the basic event related to 
human factors including “Signal is not monitored”, “signal interpretation failure”, 
“communication error”, “setting error”, and “rule violation” are assumed as the same 
values used by Zeng (Zeng, 2015), which were obtained from literature review and input 
from experts.  In order to obtain probability values for basic events not included in Zeng’s 
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thesis, the same approach was implemented using the parents’ nodes information as shown 
in Figure 18. For the probability calculation of the basic event “employee skills” different 
parent nodes were included such as supervision, procedure, competence, working under 
pressure, communication and risk perception. The parent nodes (human factor nodes) were 
ranked following a TNormal distribution with 5 level: very low, low, medium, high, and 
very high. The influence of each parent node over the child node is weighted using an 
expression available in AgenaRisk (Weighted Mean). The weights scale used is defined 
from 1 to 5, in which 5 is assigned to the human factor with more importance.  For this 
case study the weight value is assigned based on engineer judgment as it is show in the 
Table 10.  The probability calculation of the “employee skills” is shows in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 18. Parent and child nodes of the "employee skills" basic event.
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Table 10.  Weight values of child nodes. 
Employee skills (Software reliability) 
Child nodes Parent nodes Weight  
Level of understanding  
Competence 5 
Supervision 2 
Procedure 4 
Level of interpretation  
Competence 5 
Working under Pressure  1 
Communication  4 
Risk perception 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Probability calculation of the basic event "employee skills." 
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Equipment Reliability: the failure rate values were gathered from OREDA 
(Technology, Society, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige, & Dnv, 2015). OREDA’s 
failure rates are calculated based on the assumption that the failure rate function is constant 
and independent of time. Therefore, the failure rates are assumed to be exponentially 
distributed. Also, the failure rates are given as “failures per million hours.” Thus, the 
failure rate is converted to “failures per year” by multiplying it by 8,760 x10-6. The 
equipment failure is modeled as a continuous distribution using built-in functions 
available in AgenaRisk. The failure rates of the flowmeter and water sensor were assigned 
based on engineering judgment.  
Area 3: Software uncertainty measurements. As mentioned in section 3.1.3., the 
Latin Hypercube method was used to develop the sensitivity analysis. This method 
partitions each input distribution into N intervals of equal probability and selects one 
sample to form each interval. In this case study, the inputs were the gas composition 
without and with inhibitor concentration (components 8, and 9, respectively as shown in 
Table 8). The method was applied to two systems, one with only the gas and another 
containing hydrate inhibitor.  
A Latin Hypercube built-in code in MATLAB was used to generate a random matrix 
of the simulations inputs to generate the hydrate equilibrium curve. The default input 
distribution in MATLAB is a uniform distribution. The command used in MATLAB to 
generate the two different random sampling matrices (with and without inhibitor) is:  
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 X is defined as the random matrix [X=lhsdesign (n, p, ’interactions’, k)], where n 
is the number of desired simulations, p is the number of variables to use in the 
Uncertainty analysis, and k is the number of iterations needed to improve the 
design.  
 For this case study, n=100, pwithout=8, pwhit= 9, k=10 and two matrices (100X8) and 
(100X9) are generated. Each variable contains 100 different points between 0 and 
1 (uniformly distributed). 
 
               Figure 20. Random matrix "with inhibitor." 
 
Figure 20 shows a representation of the random matrix, where all the 100 values 
for each variable have values between 0-1.  
Therefore, in order to define the inputs for the simulation to run in PVTsim, a range 
with a minimum and a maximum for each variable is defined (the % is assumed based on 
engineering judgment, considering a reasonable composition change in a period of time) 
to represent the variability as follows:  
 Without inhibitor: the variability defined for almost all the components is (+/-) 
30% of the value. However, the variability defined for water is (+/-) 90%.  
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 With inhibitor: the variability defined for almost all the components is (+/-) 30% 
of the value. However, the variability defined for water is (+/-) 90% and for the 
inhibitor concentration is 50%. 
The inputs for each simulation are calculated using the following formula (Oyana & 
Margai, 2015):  
𝑌𝑛×𝑝 = 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐷(𝑋𝑛×𝑝) ∗ (𝑀𝐴𝑋 − 𝑀𝐼𝑁) + 𝑀𝐼𝑁  
Where Xnxp represents any of the random values from 0 to 1 for each simulation and 
each composition. The matrix is normalized before running the simulation on PVTSim.  
The hydrate equilibrium curve is generated 100 times for each system (with and 
without inhibitor) using PVTsim. It is used Soave-Redlich-Kwong (SRK) as an equation 
of state, because it calculates the fugacity for Natural gases more accurately than using the 
Peng-Robinson equation (N. R. Kim, Ribeiro, & Bonet, 2008). Figure 21 and Figure 22, 
show the equilibrium curves without and with inhibitor, respectively.  
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Figure 22. Hydrate equilibrium curves (with inhibitor) using PVTsim Nova. 
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Figure 21. Hydrate equilibrium curves (without inhibitor) using PVTsim Nova. 
Hydrate equilibrium curve (with inhibitor) 
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All the curves (n=100) obtained for each case, with and without inhibitors, were used 
to perform an uncertainty analysis and estimate the total model output uncertainty. This 
output uncertainty results from the uncertainty associated to the parameters in the model. 
The following statistical calculations were used to estimate the uncertainty of the model 
outputs (Reder, Alcamo, & Flörke, 2017):  
𝐸(𝑌) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑉(𝑌) =
1
𝑛 − 1
∑(𝑦𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑌))
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where (yi ) is the model output for the i
th sample of the LHS, and E(Y) represents the 
mean and V(Y) the variance. Also, the coefficient of variation (CV) is calculated and used 
as a measure of model output, giving a good estimation of the model output uncertainty 
(Reder et al., 2017).  
𝐶𝑉 =
𝜎
𝜇
=
√𝑉(𝑌)
𝐸(𝑌)
 
Because these statistics calculations are usually applied to models that generate a 
single point value as output and not a curve of values (in this case 24 points), two main 
assumptions were defined for implementing the statistic calculation to measure the 
uncertainty to the hydrate equilibrium curve:  
 The statistical calculations were applied to each variable independently developing 
two different calculations, where (𝑦𝑖) can take two values, the output temperature, 
and the output pressure of a “n” number of curves.  
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 It is assumed that each one of the 24 points in the curve correspond to each other 
in all the curves obtained (n=100), which means that: point 1 from the curve 1 
correspond to point 1 from the curve 2, and so on for all one hundred curves and 
for each point.  
Considering the two assumptions aforementioned, Table 11 show the statistic 
calculation for both cases (with and without inhibitor).  
Table 11. Uncertainty estimation of the hydrate equilibrium curve. 
Hydrate equilibrium curve without inhibitors Hydrate equilibrium curve with inhibitors 
Temperature - CV  0.65% Temperature - CV 1.95% 
Pressure - CV 6.20% Pressure - CV 17.25% 
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Figure 23. Bowtie mapping in a BN using AgenaRisk. 
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Figure 24. Fault tree event modeled in AgenaRisk as a BN: "Failure of hydrate detection." 
 
Figure 23 shows the bowtie mapped in a Bayesian Network using AgenaRisk. The 
part outside the square shows the fault tree, and the part inside shows the event tree. The 
bowtie shows some relations between two of the events: Poor inputs and Employees skills.  
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Figure 25. Fault tree event modeled in AgenaRisk: "Failure of hydrate control." 
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Figure 24 shows the model of one of the main events of the fault tree “Failure of 
hydrate detection”. The probability of the detection of hydrate would fail is 0.0247 in a 
year, which is reasonable considering that this event is frequently presented without being 
detected. Also, Figure 25 shows the model of the second main event of the fault tree 
“Failure of hydrate formation control”. The probability of the systems to control hydrate 
formation would fail is 0.438 in a year. Although the reason why this value is high can be 
due to the information used in the exercise, the literature has reported that the knowledge 
of the operators and inputs are key components contributing to the increase the reliability 
of the entire HMS. 
 
Figure 26. Probability of loss of control "Uncontrollable hydrate formation." 
 
The probability of loss of control calculated by the model is 0.0242 (Figure 26), 
which means that the probability that the preventions system fails is 0.0242 in a year.  
According with the temperature profiles along the flowlines length showed in Table 9, the 
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temperature can take values up to 60.8 ̊ F at 5 miles from the satellite platform. Therefore, 
using the hydrate equilibrium curve (Figure 22), suggests that the conditions fall over the 
hydrates zone. Thus, it is assumed the probability of hydrate formation is 1. Figure 27 
shows the event tree model with the probability of the consequences, which is the final 
outcome of the framework proposed, as show in the Table 12:  
Table 12. Probability of the consequences of the case study. 
Consequences Probability 
Loss of production I 0.0036401 
Loss of production II 2.9904E-6 
Environmental Effects  3.2895E-7 
Environmental Effects/ Safety and Health effects  3.3227E-9 
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Figure 27. Event tree modeled in AgenaRisk 
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Figure 28. Bowtie modeled as a BN in AgenaRisk.
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Locating the obtained probabilities within a generic risk matrix, all the consequences 
probabilities seems to fall into a reasonable range. For instance, using the matrix below 
(Figure 29) reprinted with permission from (Herath et al., 2016), loss of production is 
categorized as a possible event, which is the biggest concern of the hydrate formation. 
Also, environmental, safety and health effects are categorized as very unlikely, these 
results are aligned with experts experience that have mentioned that this kind of events are 
rare. 
 
Figure 29. Risk matrix. Reprinted with permission from (Herath et al., 2016). 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusions 
Hydrate formation is one of the principal flow-assurance challenges associated with 
offshore subsea oil and gas production systems in deepwater operations as hydrates can 
cause severe flow assurance problems. Operating companies have implemented different 
methods to prevent and mitigate the formation of hydrates. Although hydrate formation 
has the potential for causing safety and environmental consequences, it is difficult to 
establish a relationship between hydrate formation and these events as the evidence is not 
easy to identify. A more visible problem associated with hydrate formation is production 
deferment and asset damage in subsea systems, which causes millionaire losses. 
Although hydrate formation phenomenon has been known for many years, a full 
understanding of the mechanism of formation of hydrates does not exist and hence, its risk 
of is difficult to quantify. Since, one of the key premises of science is that you cannot 
control what you cannot measure, this research proposed a framework for modeling the 
operational risk of a hydrate management system implemented on subsea production 
systems. The framework includes three different factors: human reliability, equipment 
reliability, and software reliability: 
The advantages of the proposed framework include: 
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 Provides a methodology for obtaining quantitative data that can be used in 
quantitative risk assessments;  
 The framework identifies preventive measures for hydrate control and estimates 
the probability of failure of these preventive measurements and the probability of 
occurrence for different consequences including production loss, environmental 
effects, safety and health effects. 
 The proposed framework using a Bayesian Networks provides a structured 
visualization of the relationship between operating variables & conditions, 
operating procedures, reliability of control & preventive measures, and the 
probability of hydrate formation and its potential consequences. The use of this 
framework was tested with a hypothetical case study, which was developed as a 
proof of concept. The probabilities calculated using this framework along with the 
Bayesian Networks model were reasonable based on a general risk matrix (refer to 
Section 4.2). The results from this study provide a good starting point for further 
developing the proposed framework for a specific hydrate management system. 
 Results from the uncertainty analysis developed show that model output 
uncertainty in both cases of study, without and with inhibitor, are low. This is 
reasonable because thermodynamic models are accurate enough from an 
engineering perspective. However, it was observed that the model output 
uncertainty with inhibitors increased about 11% in the pressure calculation, which 
suggest that the uncertainty change depends on the composition 
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During the development of this thesis, there were a considerable number of 
discussions with experts, which led to one important finding: 
Nowadays, the oil and gas industry is looking to decrease or remove the use of 
inhibitors as part of the hydrate management system. One of the reasons is that the 
chemicals used as inhibitors are difficult to remove from the production stream, which 
affects its quality. The possible alternative is to use operating methods including hydraulic 
methods such fluid displacement, small depressurization, and compression methods. 
Therefore, the question now remains: is the hydrate management system becoming relying 
more on human with this approach? 
5.2 Future work 
This work was developed based on a hypothetical case study using different 
assumptions. Therefore, it is recommended to implement the framework proposed using 
a real case scenario to have a better understanding of its implementation.  
Develop an uncertainty analysis for the kinetic models using Latin Hypercube 
Sample, in order to estimate the total uncertainty of model output identifying the most 
influential parameters, the model can be optimized. 
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